The Indian public sphere has witnessed a gradual increase in discussions on caste among Muslims over the past two decades. It is important to understand the social structures of Indian Muslims in order to ascertain their political behaviour. Casteism among Muslims raises the question of whether it is exclusive to Hinduism or not. This question has cultural and structural dimensions. First, the institution of caste is fundamental to Hinduism. Second, anthropologists describe caste in structural terms that apply to relations between two and more groups in various religions and communities by birth.
Islamic society is built on the principle of equality (Masawat). But Indian Muslims have a social structure that is nearly identical to that of Hindu society’s caste system. K M Ashraf has written that “with the adoption of Islam, an average Muslim could not change his old environment, which was deeply affected by caste discrimination and general social exclusion.” As a result, Indian Islam gradually began to assimilate the casteist elements found in Hindu society.
Indian Muslim society is mainly divided into three classes, which are called—Ashraf, Ajlaf, and Arzal. Ashrafs, the elite group of Indian Muslims, are also internally divided among Sayyids, Sheikhs, Mughals, Pathans, and other upper-Hindu castes whose descendants converted to Islam. Second, Ajlafs are Muslims who converted from lower-caste Hindus, like **Hajjam (barber), Julaha (weaver), Dhuniya, Kasab (meat seller), etc, while the lowest position is occupied by Arzals. They are the Dalit Muslims. Each caste differentiates itself from each other on the basis of certain specific behaviours. The backward classes constitute around 60% of Indian Muslims, while the former untouchables are around 2%. In Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, 76% of Muslims are Pasmandas, backward classes, or Dalits.
Reports from the Sachar and Ranganath Misra Committees have highlighted the abuses and discrimination that the backward and Dalit Muslims face on a daily basis. These include social segregation, untouchability, limited or no access to education, and under-representation. Muslim children have the highest number of school dropouts after primary education, with only 2% men and 0.5% women having a college degree in rural areas. Various works have illuminated the social discrimination against Dalit Muslims, with them being deprived and isolated in social events and public facilities of general Muslim community, especially mosques and cemeteries.
In rural areas, the poverty rate for upper-caste Hindus is 14%, while it is 31% for upper-caste Muslims. Urban areas exhibit comparable disparities. Julien Levesque has highlighted that the All India Muslim Personal Law Board and Muslim leaders at the national level had most of their members from the upper castes, something that has not changed much in the last 30 years.
Numerous Muslim political parties are established nationwide, but none of them has a reputation for being the primary advocate for backward Muslims
at the national level. Muslim voters in different states have favoured different political parties over the past two decades, including the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in Kerala, Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar, Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu, and the Congress in several other states. Yogendra Yadav’s study solidifies the widely held belief that the Muslim community is split among numerous political factions and shows a wide range of preferences.
The current debate about reservations for Dalit Muslims has, however, generated new hope and has the capacity of making political parties answerable towards the community, as indicated in Shireen Azam’s article, “Scheduled Caste Status for Dalit Muslims and Christians: A Comprehensive Clarification” (EPW, 8 July 2023). The “Sneh Yatra” by the BJP has attempted to project itself as the well-wisher of Pasmanda community, however the representation of Muslims in the NDA alliance is close to zero.
The sociopolitical unity of the Muslim community has been shattered by casteism, and it is facing the same obstacles that any anti-hegemonic identity movement faces in its infancy. The Pasmanda movement also faces these difficulties when confronting an Ashraf-dominated minority politics. The Sachar Committee report helped change many perceptions about Muslims, highlighting the double discrimination faced by Pasmanda Muslims in contemporary India. It is hoped that the current debate on backward and Dalit Muslims results in policy resolutions in favour of these marginalised groups.